

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Personality in faces: Implicit associations between appearance and personality

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Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Archiving and Accessibility Statement

The raw data files and Python code to reproduce the dataset presented in the analyses of this paper is available on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/pwgkn).

Abstract

How accurate are the spontaneous trait inferences made to faces? Here we measured implicit associations between facial appearance and personality traits, using faces conveying objective appearances of Extraversion and Agreeableness. In the standard or “uncrossed” conditions of Experiment 1, we found that descriptions of high and low Agreeableness and Extraversion were spontaneously and accurately associated with their objective trait appearance. In Experiment 2, to test the specificity of this effect, we “crossed” the Implicit Association Tests, pairing faces conveying high and low Extraversion with words describing characteristics of high and low Agreeableness, and the reverse. We found evidence for associations specific to objective appearance of Agreeableness, and a general halo effect relating to Extraversion. We conclude that spontaneous assessment of personality from faces can be accurate, and can be based on trait-specific as well as general visual cues.

Keywords: personality, accuracy, facial appearance, implicit cognition

Judgments made on the basis of facial appearance can have important outcomes. Facial appearance influences political decisions (Little, Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007), hiring decisions (Luxen & Van De Vijver, 2006), and is correlated with military career progression (Mazur, Mazur, & Keating, 1984). Judgments of character from facial appearance show a high degree of agreement between observers (Kenny, Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994; Walker & Vetter, 2016), and even judgments made by children can agree with those made by adults (Cogsdill, Todorov, Spelke, & Banaji, 2014). We consider two questions arising from the prevalence and importance of these judgments. First, how accurate are personality inferences made simply on the basis of facial appearance? Second, if these judgments are accurate, are they part of an ongoing and spontaneous process, or do they occur only upon explicit instruction?

Can Personality Inference Based on Facial Appearance Be Accurate?

Accuracy of first impressions is often measured by the agreement between the self-report of targets about

their personal traits, and the estimates of those traits as made by observers. By this measure, many studies have found accurate trait inferences from facial appearance, for a diverse range of traits, including sociosexuality (Boothroyd, Cross, Gray, Coombes, & Gregson-Curtis, 2011; Boothroyd, Jones, Burt, DeBruine, & Perrett, 2008), dominance (Quist, Watkins, Smith, DeBruine, & Jones, 2011), fighting ability (Little, Třebický, Havlíček, Roberts, & Kleisner, 2015), trustworthiness (Tognetti, Berticat, Raymond, & Faurie, 2013), political affiliation (Rule & Ambady, 2010), and both physical (Jones, 2018) and mental health issues (Ward & Scott, 2018), including depression (Scott, Kramer, Jones, & Ward, 2013) and borderline personality disorder (Daros, Ruocco, & Rule, 2016).

However, concerns have been raised about how to interpret accuracy from facial appearance. In particular, Todorov and Porter (2014) have noted the importance of image selection, and the possibility of confounding cues. For example, facial photos taken from a social networking site might reflect impression management of the photo targets (Siibak, 2009), and publicity photos of politicians might be selected to convey messages about party affiliation (Olivola, Sussman, Tsetsos, Kang, & Todorov, 2012). A related point—and

anyone who has seen an unflattering photo of themselves would surely agree—vagaries of lighting, pose, and other factors mean different attributions can be given to different photographs of the same individual (Todorov & Porter, 2014). A related set of concerns is that a number of controllable cues, such as expression, pose, clothing, and hairstyle are present in facial photos (Mazur, 2005), and these controllable cues can themselves provide information, which a target may manipulate to produce both accurate and inaccurate impressions (Naumann, Vazire, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2009). The larger issue is, from the universe of possible images that could be made of a face, we need to ask, how were the photos used as stimuli selected, and how might the selection affect interpretation?

Many studies investigating trait inference from facial appearance therefore use highly constrained stimuli, typically in the form of well-lit, front-facing, neutral, “passport” images, taken by the experimenters in controlled conditions, and with cues from expression, pose, hairstyle, clothing, and cosmetics eliminated or minimized. This is not to say that highly constrained images represent a “ground truth” about appearance, but the constraints do allow for a replicable stimulus creation procedure in which all images are selected identically. We further consider issues of image selection in our discussion, but in any case, it is relevant that even with highly constrained face images, accurate inferences of Big Five personality traits (i.e., the Five-Factor Model; FFM) can be drawn, including Agreeableness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism (Jones, Kramer, & Ward, 2012; Kramer & Ward, 2010; Little & Perrett, 2007; Penton-Voak, Pound, Little, & Perrett, 2006).

A final point is that much of the work assessing trait accuracy in faces has used trait composites, made by averaging the faces of individuals high or low on FFM traits. Composite trait images might be referred to as a genuine or *objective trait appearance*: through averaging, statistical regularities in the appearance of people sharing a trait would be preserved, while idiosyncrasies would be minimized or removed. If there were no regularities in appearance, then composites images from one trait extreme would not be reliably distinguishable from composites made from the other extreme. However, personality accuracy has also been shown in individual face images, under both unconstrained (Borkenau, Brecke, Möttig, & Paelecke, 2009) and constrained (Penton-Voak *et al.*, 2006) presentations.

Are Accurate Personality Inferences from Facial Appearance Made Spontaneously, or Only Under Explicit Instruction?

The studies reviewed above demonstrate accurate trait inference using very similar methods, essentially presenting observers with faces and explicitly asking the observers to make a judgment (Penton-Voak *et al.*, 2006). This raises the question of whether accurate

inference is limited to these kinds of deliberative conditions, or whether it might be better thought of as part of a spontaneous, involuntary process. To summarize the position we develop below, we suggest the current literature does not yet answer this question. This is because with limited exceptions, previous studies looking at accuracy of trait inference from the face do not consider spontaneous judgments, and studies looking at spontaneous inference do not consider accuracy.

Clearly observers make social judgments about others, even when not instructed to do so (Uleman, 1987). This history of research is sometimes said to demonstrate that trait inference is “automatic,” but it is important to be clear about the meaning of this term. For example, some previous studies have claimed to demonstrate that social attributions to faces are made in an “automatic” way, because inference occurs even after brief presentations (Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Cogsdill *et al.*, 2014; Rule, Ambady, & Hallett, 2009). Indeed, multiple demonstrations show that attributions to faces can be made from brief exposures of approximately 50–100 ms (Borkenau *et al.*, 2009; Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Olson & Marshuetz, 2005; Rule & Ambady, 2008; Rule *et al.*, 2009; Willis & Todorov, 2006) and that unsped, deliberate contemplation of attributions produces similar results to instructions to make inferences on the basis of first impressions or gut feeling (Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Rule *et al.*, 2009).

However, “automatic” has multiple meanings with regard to cognitive processes (Bargh, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), with some of the key distinctions being made between rapid and slow; capacity-limited and capacity-free; and spontaneous and deliberative processes. For example, a process might be rapid, but made only under deliberate control. In the studies above, showing rapid inference, the explicit task for participants was to report attributes of the faces presented. These studies therefore do not show whether accurate social inference from faces is “automatic” in the sense of being made spontaneously and without specific task instruction.

Of course, there are many studies that do consider spontaneous trait inference from facial appearance (van Leeuwen & Macrae, 2004). We mentioned a few at the start of our introduction (Little & Perrett, 2007; Luxen & Van De Vijver, 2006), and there are many others (for review of spontaneous inference, see Uleman, Adil Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). However, as a general rule, previous studies on spontaneous inference to appearance either do not or cannot consider accuracy. We illustrate this point with two typical examples. Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, and Hall (2005) found that voters chose politicians that other raters found to be competent-looking. This is a spontaneous, non-instructed, use of appearance information by voters, but lacking any measure of target competency, we cannot infer that either the voting behavior, or the subsequent ratings of competence, reflected accurate judgments of competence. Similarly, consider Zebrowitz and McDonald’s (1991) famous observations

on facial appearance and litigation outcomes, for example, that attractive plaintiffs are more likely to prevail. This effect was clearly spontaneous, as judges were not asked to evaluate attractiveness. But we have no way of knowing whether the legal judgments were objectively correct, and indeed, Zebrowitz and McDonald suggest they were probably inaccurate and biased.

We are aware of only limited demonstrations for spontaneous yet accurate inferences to facial appearance, and these relate to trustworthiness. Accurate judgments of trustworthiness in economic games, defined as in-game responses benefitting the observer, can be made from “thin slices” and brief interactions (Sparks, Burleigh, & Barclay, 2016), and spontaneous yet accurate identification of trustworthiness from the face alone has also been found (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; see Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & Neys, 2017, for a review). However, even for trustworthiness the evidence is still developing. For example, Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, and De Neys (2013) found spontaneous yet accurate inference of trustworthiness for black-and-white images, cropped to an area around the internal facial features, but not for color, full-face photos. Bonnefon et al. suggest this pattern reflects observer bias to rely on non-facial features. This is an interesting explanation that shows the process of spontaneous inference from the face is not yet well understood. And as mentioned earlier, we are not aware of any demonstrations for the spontaneous yet accurate inference of FFM personality traits. Therefore our original question for this section—*are accurate trait inferences from facial appearance made spontaneously?*—does not have a clear answer and seems underexplored.

The Current Study

Here we investigate spontaneous associations to objective trait appearances of personality. In particular, we measure associations made to highly constrained composite images, created from women scoring high and low on self-reported measures for Extraversion and Agreeableness. We use a novel version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) that we will refer to as the Personality in Faces IAT (PIF-IAT). The methodology of the IAT is well known, measuring spontaneous and readily available associations between objects and concepts. Associations that are available without explicit task instruction will increase performance when a category object and a concept require a response mapped to the same key, compared to when they are mapped to separate keys. The literature on the IAT as a measure of implicit cognition is extensive, with its ability to measure unconscious and automatic social cognition both supported (Greenwald et al., 1998) and called into question, given that observers can sometimes predict their ostensibly unconscious cognitions (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014; Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007). However, for our PIF-IAT task, we are interested in

two useful, and much less controversial, aspects of the standard IAT that do not concern a measure of unconscious cognition. One is the structure of the IAT task: participants are never explicitly asked or instructed to rate the concept stimuli for the presence of the attribute. For example, in a racial IAT, participants are never explicitly asked how different positive and negative attributes might be related to the concepts of black and white people (Smith-McLallen, Johnson, Dovidio, & Pearson, 2006). Any association measured is therefore due to a spontaneous association of stimuli and responses, whether through a mechanism like priming or through strategic recoding (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). A second aspect of the IAT that is important for us lies with core principles of associative learning—people find it easier to give the same response to stimuli that are strongly associated, compared to those that are weakly associated (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Or equally, people find it more difficult to give different responses to strongly associated, compared to weakly associated, stimuli. Conceptual analyses have suggested this linkage between associated stimuli and responses could arise due to multiple mechanisms, including response priming between associated stimuli, and differential task switching costs relating to the overlap of attribute and concept features (De Houwer et al., 2009). We argue that these two aspects of the IAT make it an appropriate and potentially effective way to measure spontaneous associations between facial appearance and personality traits.

Traditional IAT approaches using faces as a category have a superordinate label that facilitates categorization, such as race (black or white; McConnell & Leibold, 2001) or age (old or young; Nosek et al., 2007). However, the face stimuli we use here are not easily described without an explicit mention of their personality types. We instead cast the faces category as an identity recognition task. We name one composite “Jane” and the other “Mary.” Participants respond to a simple identity-sorting task (*Jane, Mary*) as face stimuli appear on screen, and no mention needs to be made of any relationship between the faces and their corresponding personality traits. For testing associations of faces to personality concepts, we used words describing high or low levels of a personality trait (e.g., *kind, sympathetic, helpful, warm*; versus *cold, unsympathetic, harsh, unkind*). Because the composite faces we use represent objective trait appearances, any association between a composite and its trait-congruent personality words represents a spontaneous yet accurate association of appearance and personality.

Experiment 1a: Spontaneous Associations to Objective Trait Appearance

In our first experiment, we tested whether faces signaling Extraversion and Agreeableness were spontaneously associated with those traits. We focused on

two traits from the Five Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & Costa, 1989), Agreeableness and Extraversion. These two traits have been repeatedly shown to be cued from faces in studies using explicit report methods (Jones et al., 2012; Kramer & Ward, 2010; Little & Perrett, 2007; Penton-Voak et al., 2006). The associations measured are therefore spontaneous in the direct sense that they are not instructed. Accuracy will be determined by whether there is a bias toward congruent over incongruent face–word associations.

Method

Participants. We utilized a between-groups design, collecting separate samples for each of the IATs, with a total sample of 227. We used G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to conduct a sensitivity analysis for our studies, and our ability to detect an association if present in each of the IAT tests, as indicated by a bias significantly greater than zero in a one-sample *t*-test. With a minimum of $n = 94$ in each test, $\alpha = .05$ and $\beta = .80$, we expected to detect effect sizes of $d > 0.3$, conventionally a medium effect. The samples are described below in full. Details of participants who were excluded due to an excessive number of very fast responses after application of the revised scoring algorithm (participants removed if 10% or more of trials were < 300 ms, as outlined by Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) are also included. Ethics approval for the study was obtained from Swansea University.

Extraversion IAT. For this PIF-IAT, there were 94 participants (age $M = 32.23$, $SD = 10.49$, 57 females). Participants were recruited through Prolific.ac, and were compensated £1.25 for their participation. Three male participants were removed after scoring the data, for a final sample of $n = 91$.

Agreeableness IAT. One hundred and twenty-three participants (age unknown for two participants, age $M = 28.66$, $SD = 14.25$; 64 females) completed this PIF-IAT. Participants were recruited for course credit or through social media. One male participant was removed after scoring the data, for a final sample of $n = 122$.

Stimuli. Four facial composites used in previous research (Kramer & Ward, 2010) served as stimuli. The composites were generated from a sample of 64 Caucasian females (age $M = 21.03$, $SD = 1.94$), who posed for a neutral facial photograph before completing the Mini-IPIP (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006), a 20-item measure of the Big Five personality factors. The 15 highest and lowest scorers for Extraversion and Agreeableness were identified, and their facial photographs were averaged using Abrasoftware Fantaface Mixer. The standardized scores for each composite image on Extraversion and Agreeableness are provided in Table 1.

Across all PIF-IAT studies, high Agreeableness and Extraversion faces were named “Jane” and their low counterparts were named “Mary.” Composite faces are shown in Figure 1.

Procedure. Participants completed only one of the PIF-IATs, following the block structure described in Table 2. Before completing the task, participants were presented with a description of the categories in the experiment, and were shown the facial composites (labeled *Jane* and *Mary*) and the high and low trait words and their categories. Participants were told the experiment was a simple sorting task, matching faces to the correct identity with a keypress, and words that matched personality descriptions. They were given no further information regarding the nature of the composites. Before the trial presentations, participants were shown the images of Jane and Mary at a larger resolution (445×485) for a fixed duration of 2 min. Participants were instructed to learn the identities of Jane and Mary in preparation for the subsequent sorting task, and were unable to continue until the time had elapsed. A practice block immediately followed this familiarization task, wherein participants completed four runs of 10 trials categorizing Jane and Mary. In the first half of these trials, Jane appeared on the left and Mary on the right, before the order was switched. The purpose of this practice block was to further familiarize participants with Jane and Mary under the usual response conditions of the IAT.

Following standard IAT procedures, participants completed the seven blocks, with the orderings of “congruent” and “incongruent” blocks reversed for 48.18% of participants across both IATs. For our tasks, a congruent block was defined as responses to Jane (the composite made of high scorers on that trait) being on the same key as words describing high levels of that trait. Category labels (e.g., Jane, high Extraversion) appeared on the top left and right of the screen. Participants responded by pressing the “E” key for a left response, and the “I” key for a right response. If an error was made, a red cross appeared underneath the current stimulus, and participants had to correct their response. In test blocks, each individual word appeared twice, and images of Jane and Mary eight times each.

Both tests were conducted online, and participants completed the task over the Internet. The IAT has

Table 1. Mean Agreeableness and Extraversion scores by stimulus

Composite image	Extraversion	Agreeableness
Low Extraversion	−1.39	−0.17
High Extraversion	1.17	0.07
Low Agreeableness	0.13	−1.38
High Agreeableness	0.41	1.14

Note: Standardized mean trait scores ($M = 0$, $SD = 1$) for the 15 women within each composite image. Scores were first standardized for the 65 women in the photographic database (e.g., the women in the low Agreeableness composite had an average Agreeableness score 1.38 *SDs* below the group mean).



Fig. 1: The composite faces used in the study. Low-level trait composites appear in the left column (named “Mary” in the IAT), and high-level trait composites appear on the right (named “Jane” in the IAT). Top row: Agreeableness, bottom row: Extraversion. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Table 2. An outline of the uncrossed Extraversion Implicit Association Test (IAT)

Block	Trials	Function	Left key response	Right key response
1	16	Practice	Jane (high Extraversion composite)	Mary (low Extraversion composite)
2	16	Practice	High Extraversion words	Low Extraversion words
3	32	Test	Jane & high Extraversion words	Mary & low Extraversion words
4	32	Test	Jane & high Extraversion words	Mary & low Extraversion words
5	16	Practice	Mary (low Extraversion composite)	Jane (high Extraversion composite)
6	32	Test	Jane & low Extraversion words	Mary & high Extraversion words
7	32	Test	Jane & low Extraversion words	Mary & high Extraversion words

Note: As is standard for IAT procedures, blocks 1, 3, and 4 are switched respectively with blocks 5, 6, and 7, to vary the order in which congruent (shown) and incongruent trials appear. In the crossed version of this IAT, high and low Agreeableness words appear alongside Extravert composites. The reverse is true for Agreeableness composites.

been used extensively as a web-based experiment successfully (e.g., Project Implicit; Greenwald *et al.*, 2003), and so we considered a non-laboratory sample suitable for this study.

Results

Reaction time data were converted to IAT-*D* scores, which are a form of effect size measure, comparing the latencies in congruent to incongruent conditions. A positive *D* score in our case reflects a bias to make the congruent association; for example, high extraversion composites with high extraversion words. The *D*-scores were calculated according to the revised scoring algorithm described by Greenwald *et al.* (2003). As a correct response was required after an incorrect trial, we added the time taken to provide a correct response to the initial reaction time as an error penalty. The raw data files and Python code to reproduce the

dataset presented in the analyses of this article are available on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/pwgkn).

We conducted an initial one-sample *t*-test against zero to test for the significance of any association between the faces and trait words. We found a significant *D* score for Extraversion, *D* = 0.29, 95% CI [0.21, 0.37], *t*(90) = 7.29, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.76; and for Agreeableness, *D* = 0.30, [0.23, 0.38], *t*(121) = 8.14, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.74. Facial composites of personality traits were therefore spontaneously and accurately associated with corresponding trait words.

Experiment 1b: Eliminating Naming Confounds

Our initial results indicate that associations to faces conveying actual personality information are accurate and can occur spontaneously. However, a possible

confound is our use of fixed category labels for each image. For example, the low Agreeableness composite was always called “Mary.” It is possible that these names may drive the accurate and spontaneous associations shown. Although we have no reason to expect that Mary and Jane might differ significantly in the associations they drive, and while these names are relatively high-frequency and unremarkable, it is nevertheless certainly conceivable that the names, rather than the faces, might be driving the associations: for example, “Jane” might be perceived as a more friendly or outgoing name than “Mary.” We therefore carried out a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 with the name labels swapped. That is, high level trait composites were now named “Mary,” and low level composites were named “Jane.” If the names are indeed driving spontaneous trait attributions, the strength and direction of biases should now change.

Indeed, although there is mixed evidence about the degree to which names are linked to appearance (compare Kramer & Jones, 2015; Zwebner, Sellier, Rosenfeld, Goldenberg, & Mayo, 2017), observers can associate different kinds of names with different personality dimensions (Kramer & Jones, 2015; Zwebner *et al.*, 2017), and pairing faces with more desirable names increases the attractiveness of the face (Garwood, Cox, Kaplan, Wasserman, & Sulzer, 1980). Moreover, names that were more popular in the past (such as those used here) are generally assigned lower ratings on important social traits such as competence (Young, Kennedy, Newhouse, Browne, & Thiessen, 1993).

Method

Procedure and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, except that the labels associated with each image were now swapped.

Participants. One hundred and sixty-eight additional participants were recruited through Prolific.ac, and were compensated with £1.25. For the name reversal Extraversion PIF-IAT, there were 86 participants (age unknown for 10 participants, age $M = 35.58$, $SD = 14.06$; 56 females). Two males were removed after scoring, for a final sample of $n = 84$. An additional 82 participants completed the Agreeableness PIF-IAT (age unknown for nine participants, age $M = 36.28$, $SD = 11.19$; 39 females), with five males removed after scoring, for a final sample of $n = 77$. With a minimum of $n = 77$ in each test, $\alpha = .05$ and $\beta = .80$, we expected to detect a bias significantly greater than zero, assuming an effect size of $d > 0.3$, as before.

Results

A one-sample *t*-test against zero revealed significant biases for both the sets of stimuli: Extraversion,

$D = 0.29$, (0.20, 0.38), $t(83) = 6.16$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.68$, and Agreeableness, $D = 0.28$, (0.18, 0.38), $t(76) = 5.53$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.63$, successfully replicating the initial study. Importantly, there were no significant differences between *D* scores from Experiment 1a and those collected here, for both Extraversion, $t(178) = 0.13$, $p = .895$, $d = 0.02$, as well as Agreeableness, $t(203) = 0.94$, $p = .349$, $d = 0.13$, ruling out the possibility that the name labels had any particular influence on the accurate and spontaneous attributions already observed.

Experiment 2: Specificity of Implicit Associations

The results of Experiment 1 suggest that associations to “objective trait appearances,” depicting Extraversion and Agreeableness, are accurate and occur spontaneously. However, these associations might have been generated in two ways. First, spontaneous attributions could be based on specific personality information contained in the composite images. For example, the high Agreeableness composite might contain visual cues specific to traits like warmth and empathy, and the low Extraversion composite, specific cues to traits like a reserved nature. Alternatively, spontaneous attributions could be based on a general attractiveness or other halo of social desirability (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). For example, by this account, the high Extraversion composite would be attributed to an outgoing nature, but also other socially desirable characteristics not directly related to Extraversion, such as warmth and empathy. Of course, these possibilities are not exclusive, and objective trait appearances could contain both general cues to social desirability, and specific cues to the corresponding trait. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect a priori that all personality traits should reveal the same cue structure: some traits might be revealed by specific cues, and others by general ones.

In our second experiment, we assessed to what extent accuracy of spontaneous attributions related to general and to specific cues. This time, rather than pair Extraversion composites with Extraversion words, and Agreeableness composites with Agreeableness words, as in Experiment 1, we crossed the mapping. We paired Extraversion composites with trait words related to Agreeableness, and Agreeableness composites with trait words related to Extraversion. If accuracy in Experiment 1 were entirely due to *general* cues for social desirability, then the crossed mappings should have little effect on the total bias. That is, significant bias in this “crossed” version of the PIF-IAT would indicate that the trait composites contain general cues to social desirability that transfer to other traits. Alternatively, if accuracy for a trait were due entirely to *specific* personality cues within the composites, then when the composite-word mappings are crossed, no association bias should be found. That is,

in this case bias is the result of specific personality cues in the composites that do not transfer to other traits. Finally, if we find both a significant bias in the crossed version, and one that is nevertheless reduced relative to the uncrossed version, the implication is that the composite contains both general and personality-specific cues.

Method

Participants. One-hundred and sixty-eight (168) participants were recruited for course credit and through social media. For the crossed Extraversion PIF-IAT (i.e., faces signaling Extraversion paired with Agreeableness words), there were 79 participants (age unknown for three participants, age $M = 27.04$, $SD = 11.58$; 45 females). Two male participants were removed after scoring the data, for a final sample of $n = 77$. For the crossed Agreeableness PIF-IAT (faces signaling Agreeableness with Extraversion words), there were 90 participants (age unknown for one participant, age $M = 25.07$, $SD = 9.29$; 56 females), with one female participant removed after data scoring, for a final sample of $n = 89$. Power was comparable to Experiment 1a: With a minimum of $n = 77$ in each test, $\alpha = .05$ and $\beta = .80$, we expected to detect a bias significantly greater than 0, assuming an effect size of $d > 0.3$.

Stimuli and procedure. All other aspects of the method were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the words corresponding to Extraversion were presented with the Agreeableness composites, and the words corresponding to Agreeableness were presented with the Extraversion composites.

Results

Scoring was identical to Experiment 1. We found a significant positive D score for Extraversion, $D = 0.24$, 95% CI [0.13, 0.35], $t(76) = 4.41$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.50$; but not for Agreeableness, $D = -0.08$, [-0.18, 0.01], $t(88) = 1.79$, $p = .076$, $d = -0.19$. These results on their own imply that associations with the Extraversion composites reflect a general halo effect, while associations to the Agreeableness composites are consistent with specific visual cues to Agreeableness.

To verify any differences in bias between the “uncrossed” Experiment 1, and the “crossed” version in Experiment 2, we submitted the D scores from both Experiments to a 2 (Trait of Face: Extraversion or Agreeableness) \times 2 (Crossover: Uncrossed Experiment 1 or Crossed Experiment 2) mixed ANOVA, using Type III sums of squares to mitigate the unbalanced cell sizes. There was a main effect of Trait of Face, such that Extraversion faces ($M = 0.26$, [0.20, 0.33]) produced higher D scores than Agreeableness faces ($M = 0.11$, [0.05, 0.17]), $F(1, 375) = 12.18$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. There was also a main effect of Crossover, such that D scores were higher in the Uncrossed

condition ($M = 0.30$, [0.24, 0.35]) than when facial signals did not match the associated personality descriptions in the Crossed condition ($M = 0.08$, [0.01, 0.14]), $F(1, 375) = 23.99$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. Finally, both of these main effects should be interpreted in the context of the significant interaction of Trait and Crossover (as shown in Figure 2), $F(1, 375) = 14.73$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. To further explore this interaction, we ran contrasts between Crossover conditions for Extraversion and for Agreeableness. Results for Extraversion were unaffected by Crossover, $M_{\text{Diff}} = 0.05$, (-0.08, 0.17), $p = .476$, $d = 0.11$, while there was a difference for Agreeableness, $M_{\text{Diff}} = 0.39$, (0.27, 0.50), $p < .001$, $d = 0.91$.

Figure 3 illustrates estimates of the general and specific signals within the Extraversion and Agreeableness composites. The signal for general social desirability is estimated simply as the bias shown in the Crossed conditions, that is, the association between appearance and the social desirability of a different trait (e.g., Agreeable appearance and Extraversion trait adjectives). The specific signal is estimated as the difference in bias between the Uncrossed and Crossed conditions, that is, the strength of association of faces with their corresponding trait, which is not explained by a general bias.

Our findings suggest that accuracy for the Extraversion and Agreeableness composites are based on very different forms of information. Results from Extraversion can be explained by a general halo effect relating to social desirability of either trait tested. However, visual signals of Agreeableness were specifically associated with the trait of Agreeableness.




Fig. 2: Data summaries across all four PIF-IATs. Black circles represent the average D score, error bars represent 95% CI. Error bars not crossing the zero-line represent a significant bias. Trait indicates the Five-Factor Model (FFM) trait conveyed in the faces, either Extraversion or Agreeableness. In uncrossed conditions, D reflects the association of the faces to words of the same trait; in crossed conditions, D reflects associations between faces communicating one trait and words describing the other trait




Fig. 3: Estimated strength of general and specific signals. General social desirability estimates are the bias the objective trait appearance received under the “crossed” condition, while trait-specific signals are calculated as the difference between uncrossed and crossed bias scores for each trait appearance

General Discussion

We investigated spontaneous associations with objective trait appearances of Extraversion and Agreeableness using a variant of the IAT, the Personality in Faces IAT or PIF-IAT. In the standard, “uncrossed,” conditions of Experiment 1, participants correctly and spontaneously associated facial composites of women scoring high or low on these traits with corresponding trait adjectives. For example, composites of women scoring high on trait Agreeableness were more frequently associated with high-agreeable attributes like “friendly” and “warm.” After ruling out the possibility that the name labels used drove the effect in Experiment 1b, the nature of these associations was clarified in the “crossed” conditions of Experiment 2, in which the composites were paired with the adjectives unrelated to their trait (Extraversion composites with Agreeableness words, and vice versa). Here we found evidence of a general halo effect for Extraversion, and a more specific trait association relating to Agreeableness. That is, while Extraversion composites were associated with words describing Agreeableness, Agreeableness composites showed no bias relating to Extraversion. Our interpretation of these findings is that while spontaneous and accurate inference relating to Agreeableness reflects genuine cues to Agreeableness within the composites, the apparent accuracy found in Experiment 1 for Extraversion composites may simply reflect a general association of positive traits with the high Extraversion composite and negative traits to the low. Taken together, our results indicate that visual cues correlated with personality can be

associated with both specific trait perceptions and general social desirability, and that these associations can occur at an implicit, spontaneous level of cognition.

General and Trait-Specific Effects

The halo effect we observed for Extraversion composites is consistent with previous work suggesting that extraverts may be more attractive than introverts (Kramer & Ward, 2010; Pound, Penton-Voak, & Brown, 2007). It has been less clear whether facial attractiveness varies greatly as a function of Agreeableness. Attractiveness related to high Agreeableness has been found in spontaneous photos of the head and upper body, although this was tied to controllable cues relating to grooming, not available in the constrained facial images used here (Meier, Robinson, Carter, & Hinsz, 2010). However, most relevant would be previous work with these stimuli by Kramer and Ward (2010), who found a difference in attractiveness between the high and low Extraversion composites, and a smaller but significant difference between the Agreeableness composites. Therefore, a significant difference in rated attractiveness is not sufficient to produce a spontaneous association with all positive traits.

This might mean simply that the attractiveness difference for the Agreeableness composites was present but not large enough to drive a general bias (that is, the halo was not “big enough”). Another speculative hypothesis would be that ratings of facial attractiveness could reflect two factors. First, physically attractive features of the face (e.g., evidence of femininity in women), would drive halo effects and general positive associations. Second, attractiveness ratings might be influenced in a more specific manner by the social attributions made to that face. For example, a face high in agreeableness might be rated as attractive because it is sending a desirable social signal indicating agreeableness. We speculate that these specific social attributions might not as readily generalize to other traits. This speculation simply underscores the point that further investigations are needed to better understand the relationship between attractiveness and social attributions, and in what ways this goes beyond a simple halo. For example, attractive targets may motivate observers to take on a more thorough analysis of the target’s social attributes, which may affect impression accuracy (Biesanz, 2010), and impression accuracy may also feedback to affect the observer’s ratings of attractiveness (Lorenzo, Biesanz, & Human, 2010).

However, we can rule out one possibility for the halo effect seen with the Extraversion composites: namely, a confound between Extraversion and Agreeableness scores in the Extraversion composites. The high and low Extraversion composites consisted of women with almost identical mean Agreeableness scores (Table 1).

Implications for Observers

Our results argue that observers can spontaneously make accurate inferences from facial appearance, most clearly demonstrated by the trait-specific signal of Agreeableness. However, the generalized halo we observed for Extraversion composites simultaneously demonstrates how spontaneous associations can be misleading. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of the human brain as a highly functional, well-tuned processor for social information (Alexander, 1990; Little, 2017; Trivers, 2000) with the idea that inaccurate and possibly misleading associations are being routinely drawn from facial appearances (Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Todorov & Porter, 2014). We speculate that associations from appearance are spontaneously drawn, not because observers are always correct—as they evidently are not—but because they are being rewarded sufficiently often to keep drawing these surface impressions. That is, accuracy from shallow inference does not necessarily need to be high, but better than chance under some circumstances. An evolutionary perspective on communication also reminds us to consider the perspective of the signal sender, in this case the person whose face is being “read.” Unless there are benefits, on average, to both the signal sender and receiver, the signal system would not be expected to be maintained over evolutionary time (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003). For example, senders may benefit by embedding false or manipulative cues within a generally reliable communication channel (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). From this adaptive perspective, we might therefore expect all sorts of communication channels to demonstrate a mixture of valid and invalid messages, including communication of personality from facial appearance (Little, 2017). An important and unresolved question is how to understand the possible adaptive benefits for signaling undesirable social traits (or alternatively, of failing to signal desirable social traits). One possibility is that there may be some social benefit to simply being predictable (Biesanz, 2010). For example, if a target is low in Agreeableness, they might be better off “admitting” that through their appearance, than risking punishment for advertising a trait they do not have (e.g., the increased punishment given to attractive fraudsters, Sigall & Ostrove, 1975).

Implications for Targets: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

We have already considered some of the debate around the IAT. To be clear, we make no claims that the associations we measured are necessarily unconscious, but it is important that they are spontaneous. Spontaneous inference is an interesting and potentially important phenomenon, as claims that targets are “involuntarily broadcasting” a message about their personality to observers (Scott *et al.*, 2013) really only apply if accurate personality inference is occurring spontaneously. Our results therefore seems to increase

the plausibility of appearance-based self-fulfilling prophecies, in which targets conform to observer reactions. To illustrate this speculation, consider a hypothetical case of two individuals—A and B—who are initially both high in Agreeableness, but while Person A appears highly agreeable (i.e., observers correctly attribute high Agreeableness to A’s facial appearance), person B does not (i.e., observers incorrectly attribute low agreeableness to B’s facial appearance). While both A and B initially behave in a highly agreeable way, the actions of A are more likely to be correctly interpreted as agreeable by others. Over time, these reactions, based on shallow appearances, could lead to greater reward for agreeable behaviors for A than for B, such that each individual’s behavior becomes aligned to their appearance.

This kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy” hypothesis has also been used to describe the possible relationship between facial appearance accurately conveying depressive symptomatology, and negative observer reactions to those same faces (Scott *et al.*, 2013). In fact, the notion of appearance-based observer reactions influencing individual trait development has a long history, particularly for mental health (Coyne, 1976). Our current results are important for these models, because while there will be some situations in which observers deliberately evaluate appearance for specific traits (e.g., “How sociable does this person appear?”), spontaneous trait inference means that observer reactions will be expected to have greater impact, as they will be continual and ongoing, not contextually bound, and not task relevant.

Accurate Trait Inference from Appearance

Finally, we consider an overarching question that lies behind both this study and related research. Is there variation in facial appearance that is correlated with variation in personality? The fact that observers can accurately discriminate trait levels appears to show this, but here we address two points raised by Todorov and Porter (2014), relating to the accuracy of social impressions from appearance. The first is that accuracy must be considered within the context of image selection, and whether there are biases in this process. One can ask whether the categorization of the people in the photos is confounded with physical qualities of the photos (e.g., comparing criminal mug shots to the “NimStim” database, Valla, Ceci, & Williams, 2011). A second question is whether the images might have been selected to convey particular messages (e.g., images posted on dating websites might be selected for uploading because of the information they signal). In the current study, similar to others on accuracy from facial inference (Jones *et al.*, 2012; Kramer & Ward, 2010; Little & Perrett, 2007; Penton-Voak *et al.*, 2006), all images were generated by experimenters using a controlled environment and through asking the targets to provide a neutral expression for the camera, with controllable cues minimized. This procedure

avoids the most obvious criticisms of selection bias. However, it does not mean that these images represent the ground truth about appearance. Consider that having one's photograph taken creates a social context, and as such, there remains scope for some individual variability to emerge. For example, individuals could differ in the posture of their head, mouth, eyes, and other areas, from both voluntary and involuntary responses to the demands of the social situation. Systematic appearance differences arising within the context of highly constrained images therefore might not arise in all other contexts. But, even if this speculation were correct—and at present we have no evidence one way or the other—it would mean that accuracy arises from the social signals sent by the people in the photos, in the absence of any obvious social goal (such as appearing attractive for a dating website).

This leads us to the second point raised by Todorov and Porter (2014): What are we to make of accurate social inference from appearance in any case, given that different images of the same person can lead to different inferences? Our perspective is that yes, from the universe of possible images that could be taken of a person's face, many different impressions can be made. Some will appear warm, some will be frightening, some will look confused, some will be unflattering. Some will reflect true traits, others transient emotional states, and others will be completely misleading. What we and others have shown is that it is relatively easy to isolate—from the universe of possible face images—a rather ordinary and unremarkable context that can, on average, reveal something about people's trait levels from mere appearance.

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